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Income Inequality, Progressive
Taxation, and Tax Expenditures
James R. Hines Jr.
University of Michigan and NBER

There are important and growing concerns about income inequality
in the United States and other high-income countries. These concerns
reﬂect rising apprehension about the political and social consequences
of inequality and worries that the advance of technology, expanding
international trade and investment, and other economic developments
may have signiﬁcantly widened income gaps in recent decades and will
continue to do so in the future. In the United States, these concerns have
prompted renewed calls for political activism and vigorous searches for
policy measures that might improve the relative economic positions of
low- and middle-income Americans.
There are many ways in which government policies can and do
inﬂuence the distribution of income, though redistributive policies can
be costly from the standpoint of economic eﬃciency and growth. Since
as a realistic matter it is unlikely that feasible reforms to any one individual government program would fully address current income distribution concerns, it is useful to consider a range of policy options and
their likely eﬀects on the distribution of income and the performance
of the economy. It is particularly valuable to identify measures that
address distributional concerns eﬃciently.
This chapter considers the design of a tax system in an economy
with signiﬁcant income inequality, focusing on the impact of provisions—such as tax deductions and tax credits—that oﬀer beneﬁts to
some but not all taxpayers. Taxation directly aﬀects the distribution of
after-tax incomes by imposing larger burdens on some than it does on
others, and it indirectly aﬀects the distribution of income through the
government programs it ﬁnances. A tax program designed to address
income distribution concerns is one that imposes burdens based on abil-
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ity to pay and that guarantees adequate funding for appropriate government programs; consequently, tax reforms can be evaluated based on the
extent to which they permit the tax system to perform these functions.
The U.S. federal income tax imposes tax burdens based largely on
ability to pay. The U.S. tax system is progressive, meaning that a taxpayer’s burden measured as a percentage of income generally rises with
income. The U.S. tax system achieves this progressivity largely with
tax rates that increase with income and with the provision of refundable
tax credits to low-income working families. As a result, most of the
revenue raised by the U.S. federal income tax comes from high-income
taxpayers, with a sizable portion of the income-earning U.S. population
paying zero or negative federal income taxes.
Despite the progressivity of the U.S. income tax, there are frequently voiced concerns that the system aﬀords too many unwarranted
tax breaks, particularly for high-income taxpayers.1 These concerns are
understandable but misplaced. They are understandable because much
of the popular discussion of tax policy focuses on apparent inequities
created by the availability of tax preferences for which certain taxpayers and not others are eligible. For example, only those taxpayers who
itemize their tax deductions are able to receive tax reductions due to
mortgage payments, charitable contributions, and state and local tax
payments. Prior to passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, only
about 30 percent of the taxpaying population chose to itemize deductions, with the remaining 70 percent claiming the standard deduction
instead.2 Since the 30 percent who itemized their deductions were
concentrated among high-income taxpayers, it follows that this highincome group received most of the beneﬁts of the favorable federal tax
treatment of mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and
local tax payments. By increasing the standard deduction, the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act signiﬁcantly reduced the number of U.S. taxpayers claiming the standard deduction, and in the process it further concentrated
the beneﬁts of tax deductions among the wealthy. Hence, a simple calculation of the distribution of the beneﬁts of itemized deductions might
conclude that the provision of these deductions reduces tax equity by
providing beneﬁts almost entirely to taxpayers with high incomes.
On closer examination, it becomes apparent that equity-based concerns about these tax preferences are misplaced, because in fact tax
preferences are critical features of progressive tax systems—and indeed,
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are what make it possible for tax systems to exhibit high degrees of
progressivity, with all the social beneﬁts that are associated with progressivity. There are two reasons for this, the ﬁrst of which is that tax
preferences make it possible to design taxes eﬃciently, since by providing preferential taxation of highly responsive activities it is possible to
diﬀerentiate taxes in a way that is less costly to the economy. The economic distortions associated with high tax rates are important considerations in limiting the extent of taxation and tax progressivity, both in
theory and in practice. Since high marginal tax rates discourage income
production, the cost of imposing high tax rates rises with the degree
to which economic activity is sensitive to taxation. Governments can
choose to oﬀer tax preferences for activities that are highly sensitive
to taxation, which subjects these activities to lower eﬀective tax rates,
and thereby subjects relatively insensitive activities to comparatively
higher rates of taxation. This type of tax design reduces the eﬃciency
cost of high tax rates and thereby makes it feasible to implement a more
progressive tax system.
The second reason tax preferences facilitate tax progressivity is that
properly designed tax preferences adjust tax burdens according to ability to pay, which increases the attractiveness of imposing a highly progressive tax-rate structure. One of the important equity concerns about
high degrees of tax progressivity is that high tax rates may be unduly
burdensome to taxpayers in certain circumstances. For example, even
a very-high-income taxpayer may ﬁnd it impossible or infeasible also
to pay federal income taxes at high rates if simultaneously confronted
with a combination of extraordinary medical bills, high state taxes,
high alimony payments, and other claims on resources. The adoption
of sympathetic tax treatment in the form of deductions for medical and
other expenses makes legislators and the general public more willing
than they would otherwise be to impose high tax rates on those with
very high incomes.
As a result, an equitable tax system has a relatively narrow tax base
and high tax rates, with rates that increase sharply with income. By
applying high tax rates to aﬄuent taxpayers, the system can raise revenue that more than compensates for revenue lost from tax deductions
and tax credits, and that has desirable distributional properties in the bargain. Such a system oﬀers favorable rates, refundable credits, and other
tax beneﬁts for low-income families. The tax system thereby imposes
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tax burdens according to ability to pay and raises revenue suﬃcient to
fund needed government programs. By imposing burdens according to
ability to pay and in oﬀering a sound system of government ﬁnance, a
tax system with high rates and appropriate deductions and tax credits
automatically addresses the income-distribution concerns that appropriately motivate much of the current tax-policy discussion.
There is an alternative to such a system: it is a much more strippeddown income tax that oﬀers very few if any deductions and tax credits.
There is considerable popular appeal to such a broad-based, low-rate
tax system, due in part to its simplicity and in part to the low rates. The
archetypal broad-based, low-rate tax system is known as a Haig-Simons
income tax, after the fundamental contributions of Robert Murray Haig
(1921) and Henry Calvert Simons (1938). In the Haig-Simons income
tax, all income is subject to taxation, without provision of deductions or
tax credits corresponding to individual taxpayer situations. The virtue
of such simplicity is not to be lightly dismissed, but this form of simplicity comes at the cost of considerable loss of tax equity, because such
a tax fails to accommodate individual circumstances, and it is unrealistic to think that a Haig-Simons income tax would ever be imposed at
highly progressive rates. Indeed, even the appeal to low tax rates immediately reveals that there is a limit to the range of possible tax progressivity, which limits the extent to which those who are best positioned
to pay taxes ultimately do so. Those who advocate for broad-based,
low-rate tax systems frequently fail to recognize the intimate connection between the breadth of the tax base and the extent to which the
government is able to adopt a system that taxes according to ability to
pay. The purpose of this chapter is to draw attention to this connection,
and to recommend that the United States and other countries do more to
tailor their tax systems in ways that make them more progressive.

DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES OF THE U.S.
INCOME TAX
The U.S. federal government collects revenue from several sources,
of which two are by far the most important: 1) employment-related payroll taxes, which ﬁnance Social Security and Medicare, and 2) the per-
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sonal income tax, which ﬁnances most of the rest of the government.3
This paper focuses on the income tax, which is the primary discretionary source of revenue for the federal government—and which by its
nature is the part of the revenue system that is most amenable to the
imposition of burdens according to ability to pay. U.S. payroll taxes
are unlike income and other taxes in that eligibility for retirement beneﬁts, disability insurance, and medical insurance requires payment of
employment taxes—whereas receipt of other federal beneﬁts are not
conditional on paying income taxes. For example, workers who have
higher wage and salary income, and therefore pay greater Social Security taxes, receive higher monthly beneﬁts from the Social Security system when they retire. Furthermore, the Social Security system provides
beneﬁts in a highly progressive way, with income replacement rates
that are much higher at low incomes than they are at higher incomes.
Consequently, the Social Security system achieves its distributional
objectives not through its tax features but instead through its beneﬁt
formula—which would make any distributional examination of Social
Security taxes incomplete, given the close connection of Social Security taxes and beneﬁts.
U.S. federal income-tax burdens rise with income, largely reﬂecting the progressive nature of tax rates. The latest available data cover
pre-2018 federal law, with Table 7.1 presenting calculations for tax year
2014. In that year, an adjusted gross income of $465,600 put a taxpayer
in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, and such taxpayers faced
average tax rates of 27.2 percent. This top 1 percent of the U.S. income
distribution had 20.6 percent of aggregate U.S. personal income that
year and paid 39.5 percent of total federal income taxes. An adjusted
gross income of $189,000 put a taxpayer in the top 5 percent of the
income distribution; and this group faced average tax rates of 23.6 percent, earned 36 percent of aggregate U.S. personal income that year,
and paid 60 percent of federal income taxes. By contrast, the half of the
United States that had incomes below $38,200 faced average tax rates
of just 3.5 percent, had only 11.3 percent of personal income, and paid
just 3.5 percent of federal income taxes.
Federal personal-income tax burdens in 2014 (and in other years)
rise with income levels. This is largely the product of tax rates that
increase with income, exempt amounts, and standard and personal
deductions that permit taxpayers to earn signiﬁcant income before it
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Table 7.1 Income Distribution, Tax Rates, and Tax Payments, 2014
Income
Income cutoﬀs Average tax
Cumulative Cumulative tax
groups (%)
($ 000s)
rates (%)
incomes (%) payments (%)
Top 1
465.6
27.2
20.6
39.5
Top 5
189.0
23.6
36.0
60.0
Top 10
133.4
21.3
47.2
70.9
Top 25
77.7
17.8
68.9
86.8
Top 50
38.2
15.5
88.7
97.3
Bottom 50
3.5
11.3
3.5
NOTE: The table presents average federal income tax rates, total incomes, and total
federal income tax payments by six income groups for tax year 2014. Income groups
are classiﬁed by adjusted gross income (AGI) as reported on tax forms. Income cutoﬀs
denote the minimum AGI to be included in the group. Cumulative incomes denote the
fraction of total U.S. AGI earned by members of the income group; similarly, cumulative tax payments denote the fraction of total U.S. federal income tax payments by
members of the group.
SOURCE: Dungan (2017).

becomes taxable, as well as refundable tax credits available to lowincome earners. In 2014, a married couple was not taxable until its
income exceeded amounts covered by exemptions and deductions, and
then was initially taxable at just 10 percent for the ﬁrst $18,150 of net
taxable income. Such a couple then faced a 15 percent tax rate until its
taxable income reached $73,800, after which point the marginal tax rate
became 25 percent. The marginal income-tax rate rose to 28 percent at
an income of $148,851, 33 percent at an income of $226,851, 35 percent
at an income of $405,101, and 39.6 percent on any portion of income
exceeding $457,601. Furthermore, the Earned Income Tax Credit and
the Child Tax Credit were available primarily for low-income families.
Despite the evident progressivity of the federal income tax, it is possible for tax reform to make the system much more progressive than it
was in 2014 or is today. One aspect of federal taxation that is commonly
argued to work against tax progressivity is the provision of exclusions,
deductions, and tax credits, all of which are commonly called “tax
expenditures” (Surrey 1973). The most important single “tax expenditure” is the tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance. Other
signiﬁcant tax expenditures include the preferential treatment of retirement accounts; deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest, and charitable contributions; the favorable tax treatment of capital
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gains; and various tax credits. Table 7.2 displays the largest federal tax
expenditures for Fiscal Year 2016, with accompanying magnitudes of
forgone federal tax revenue because of these tax expenditures. Many of
these tax expenditures beneﬁt high-income taxpayers.
Table 7.3 presents the distribution of federal personal income tax
expenditures by income group for Tax Year 2013. The ﬁrst column
oﬀers evidence on tax exclusions, which consist of the beneﬁts of the
favorable tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance, pension
contributions, and income; the favorable tax treatment of capital gains
on assets held until death; and other smaller exclusions. As the table
indicates, 7 percent of the aggregate value of these tax exclusions is
enjoyed by taxpayers whose incomes are in the top 1 percent of the U.S.
income distribution. While the aggregate value of these beneﬁts for the
top 1 percent is obviously disproportionate to the number of taxpayers,
it is actually rather small compared to the roughly 39.5 percent of tax
Table 7.2 Largest Individual Tax Expenditures, 2016
Tax expenditure
Exclusions from taxable income:
Employer contributions for health care and insurance
Employer pension contributions and earnings
Social Security and railroad retirement beneﬁts
Capital gains at death
Interest on state and local government bonds
Fringe beneﬁts provided under cafeteria plans
Capital gains on sales of principal residences
Tax deductions:
State and local income, sales, and property taxes
Mortgage interest on owner-occupied residences
Charitable contributions
Reduced tax rates on dividends and long-term capital gains
Tax credits:
Earned Income Tax Credit
Child Tax Credit

2016 amount
($ billions)
164.6
156.1
38.4
32.9
32.9
31.3
29.2
96.6
59.0
55.2
130.9
73.0
55.0

NOTE: The table presents the aggregate dollar values (in billions) of the largest individual tax expenditure items for Fiscal Year 2016.
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2017a).
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Table 7.3 Share of Tax Expenditures by Income Group, 2013
Income
group (%)

Tax
exclusions
(%)

Top 1
Top 20
60–80
40–60
20–40
Bottom 20

7
45
23
16
10
5

Tax
Capital gains
deductions preferences
(%)
(%)
30
81
13
4
1
0

68
93
5
2
0
0

Tax
credits
(%)
0
3
12
19
29
37

Total tax
expenditures
(%)
17
51
18
13
10
8

NOTE: Figures in the table report the fraction of total U.S. tax beneﬁts of each tax
preference category received by each of the designated income groups, as deﬁned by
adjusted gross income. “Tax exclusions” consist of tax beneﬁts from the exclusion
from taxable income of employer-provided health insurance, net pension contributions and earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, a portion of Social
Security and railroad retirement beneﬁts, and other items. “Tax deductions” consist of
tax beneﬁts from the itemized deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest,
charitable contributions, and others. “Capital gains preferences” are the beneﬁts of the
preferential tax rates at which long-term gains are taxed. “Tax credits” consist of tax
beneﬁts from the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and other available
credits. “Total tax expenditures” is the sum of all of these tax beneﬁts.
SOURCE: CBO (2013).

payments (and 20.6 percent of income) accounted for by the top 1 percent of taxpayers. Table 7.3 indicates that the top 20 percent of income
earners in 2013 received 45 percent of the tax beneﬁts from tax exclusions—which, again, while disproportionate to that group’s numbers, is
rather less than the share of this top-income quintile in tax payments or
income. By contrast, taxpayers whose incomes are in the bottom two
income quintiles received 15 percent of the aggregate tax beneﬁt of
exclusions, which is a sizable beneﬁt considering that the bottom half
of income earners has 11.3 percent of aggregate income and pays just
3.5 percent of aggregate U.S. income taxes.
The second column of Table 7.3 presents information on the distribution of the beneﬁts of tax deductions, which include beneﬁts from
deducting state and local taxes, mortgage interest payments, charitable contributions, and other expenses. These beneﬁts are more heavily
concentrated among high-income taxpayers than are the beneﬁts of tax
exclusions. As the table indicates, taxpayers whose incomes are in the
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top 1 percent receive 30 percent of the aggregate beneﬁts of tax deductions; income earners in the top quintile of the distribution receive 81
percent of the aggregate beneﬁts of tax deductions. These percentages
correspond roughly to shares of aggregate tax payments. By contrast,
income earners in the bottom quintile of the distribution receive only
negligible beneﬁts from tax deductions, reﬂecting both the low tax
rates against which they take deductions and the very small fraction of
such taxpayers who itemize deductions rather than taking the standard
deduction.
The third and fourth columns of Table 7.3 display information on
distributions of the beneﬁts of capital-gain preferences and tax credits.
These two series exhibit very diﬀerent distributional properties. The
beneﬁts of capital-gain preferences—the low rates at which long-term
capital gains are taxed—are very strongly concentrated among highincome taxpayers, with the top quintile of income earners enjoying
93 percent of the aggregate beneﬁt of these low tax rates, while the
bottom two quintiles of income earners enjoy only negligible beneﬁts.
The opposite is true of the beneﬁts of tax credits, which arise almost
entirely from the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit.
The bottom two quintiles of income earners enjoy 66 percent of the
aggregate beneﬁts of tax credits, whereas the top quintile of income
earners receive only negligible beneﬁts.
The ﬁfth column of Table 7.3 displays shares of aggregate beneﬁts
from all tax expenditures taken together. Because of the signiﬁcance of
tax deductions and capital-gain preferences, aggregate tax expenditure
beneﬁts are again concentrated among high-income taxpayers, with 17
percent accruing to the top 1 percent of taxpayers, and 51 percent to the
top quintile. By contrast, the bottom quintile of income earners receives
only 8 percent of the aggregate beneﬁts of tax expenditures, and the
20–40 percent quintile receives 10 percent of the aggregate beneﬁts.
Table 7.4 presents information on the beneﬁts of aggregate tax
expenditures expressed as shares of after-tax incomes. This method of
presenting the values of tax expenditures implicitly modiﬁes the entries
to adjust for the dollar values of the beneﬁts provided by diﬀerent types
of tax expenditures. For example, since the aggregate dollar value of tax
exclusions greatly exceeds the aggregate dollar value of tax deductions,
the distribution of tax exclusions has greater impact on the ﬁnal distribution of after-tax incomes than does the distribution of tax deductions.
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Table 7.4 Values of Tax Expenditures as Shares of After-Tax Income, by
Income Group, 2013 (%)
Tax
Tax
Capital gains
Tax
Total tax
Income
exclusions deductions preferences
credits expenditures
group (%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Top 1
3.2
3.9
5.3
0.0
13.1
Top 20
4.7
2.5
1.7
0.1
9.4
60–80
5.2
0.8
0.2
0.7
7.3
40–60
5.0
0.4
0.1
1.5
7.3
20–40
4.5
0.2
0.0
3.3
7.9
Bottom 20
4.2
0.0
0.0
8.1
11.7
NOTE: Figures in the table report values of total U.S. tax beneﬁts of each tax preference
category received by each of the designated income groups, expressed as fractions
of group income. “Tax exclusions” consist of tax beneﬁts from the exclusion from
taxable income of employer-provided health insurance, net pension contributions and
earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, a portion of Social Security and
railroad retirement beneﬁts, and other items. “Tax deductions” consist of tax beneﬁts
from the itemized deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest, charitable
contributions, and others. “Capital gains preferences” are the beneﬁts of the preferential tax rates at which long-term gains are taxed. “Tax credits” consist of tax beneﬁts
from the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and other available credits.
“Total tax expenditures” is the sum of all of these tax beneﬁts.
SOURCE: CBO (2013).

Despite a normalization by after-tax incomes, it remains the case that
the values of tax deductions and capital-gain preferences appear to be
concentrated among high-income taxpayers: the top 1 percent receive
beneﬁts from tax deductions equal to 3.9 percent of their incomes, and
they receive beneﬁts from capital-gains preferences equal to 5.3 percent
of their incomes. By contrast, taxpayers with incomes in the bottom 40
percent of the income distribution receive beneﬁts from tax deductions
equal to just 0.2 percent of their incomes and receive only negligible
beneﬁts from capital gains preferences. The beneﬁts of tax exclusions
in Table 7.4 appear to be spread across the population roughly in proportion to after-tax incomes, and the beneﬁts of tax credits are very
strongly concentrated among low-income taxpayers, with those in the
bottom quintile of the income distribution receiving tax credits worth
8.1 percent of their incomes. By contrast, taxpayers in the top quintile
of the income distribution receive beneﬁts from tax credits equal to just
0.1 percent of their incomes.
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The ﬁfth column of Table 7.4 presents the distribution of the dollar values of tax expenditures measured as percentages of after-tax
incomes. This distribution of beneﬁts is largely ﬂat across the middle
three quintiles of the income distribution, with somewhat greater density in the bottom and top quintiles, and a mild concentration of beneﬁts
for the top 1 percent of income earners.
The evidence indicates that taxpayers in the top 20 percent of the
U.S. income distribution receive a majority of the beneﬁts of tax expenditures, from which many people quite understandably draw the conclusion that tax exclusions, deductions, and credits are antiprogressive.
One problem with this inference is that existing tax expenditures oﬀer
beneﬁts roughly in proportion to after-tax incomes, suggesting that they
serve largely as factors that reduce eﬀective tax rates by somewhat constant amounts. The second problem is that evaluating tax expenditures
in isolation relies on a view of the world in which everything else—
notably including tax rates—stays unchanged while tax preferences
disappear. This is unrealistic; governments choose tax rates together
with tax preferences, and if tax preferences were reduced in magnitude,
then government would also change tax rates. Consequently, in order
to know just what eﬀect tax expenditures have on the distribution of
income, it is necessary to understand the principles that governments
apply in designing their tax systems.

THE 2017 TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT
In December 2017, the United States enacted a major tax reform,
commonly known by the bill’s original title, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA). This legislation was initially directed at reforming the U.S.
system of corporate and international taxation, and while the TCJA did
reduce the U.S. corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent and
introduce major changes to the U.S. system of taxing foreign income,
the ﬁnal bill also included signiﬁcant cuts to individual taxes and the
taxation of income earned by unincorporated businesses. As a result,
forecasts predicted that the TCJA would reduce federal revenue collections by $1.456 trillion over 10 years; and even in the scenario in which
the tax reduction has the eﬀect of stimulating the economy, federal rev-
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enues over that time period would decline by $1.071 trillion because of
the bill’s provisions (Joint Committee on Taxation 2017b).
The 2017 legislation signiﬁcantly reduced individual taxes by lowering tax rates, almost doubling the standard deduction, doubling the
Child Tax Credit, increasing the exempt amount under the individual
alternative minimum tax (AMT), and making several other changes.
There were also several provisions that increased individual taxes, notably by removing personal exemptions, reducing and eliminating several
popular itemized deductions, and changing the method by which bracket
amounts are indexed to inﬂation. The combination of rate reductions
and limits on itemized deductions produced a lower-rate, broader-based
personal income tax system. It also produced a personal income tax
system with burdens less well targeted to ability to pay.
The 2017 TCJA reduced average eﬀective tax rates at every income
level. Table 7.5 presents a distributional analysis of the eﬀect of the
TCJA, comparing tax burdens by income level in 2017 (prior to application of the TCJA’s provisions) and 2019. As the table indicates, the
TCJA reduced personal income taxes by $259.5 billion in 2019, lowering the average personal income tax rate from 20.7 percent to 19.0
percent. The tax reductions were concentrated among higher-income
taxpayers, in part reﬂecting the reality that these individuals pay the
majority of federal income taxes. The roughly 1.7 million taxpayers
with incomes of $500,000 and above saw their aggregate federal taxes
decline by $60.8 billion between 2017 and 2019, whereas the 37.5 million taxpayers with incomes in the $20,000–$40,000 range received an
aggregate tax reduction of just $8.4 billion.
The second and third columns of Table 7.5 present average tax rates
in 2017 and 2019 for each of the listed income groups. Average tax rates
declined for each of these groups by between 0.5 and 3.1 percent, with
most of the large reductions materializing for high-income taxpayers.
For example, the average tax rate of taxpayers with $1 million or more
of income fell from 32.5 percent in 2017 to 30.2 percent in 2019; and
the average tax rate of taxpayers with annual incomes in the $500,000
to $1 million range declined from 30.9 percent in 2017 to 27.8 percent in 2019. By contrast, the average tax rate of taxpayers with annual
incomes in the $20,000–$30,000 range fell by only 0.5 percent, from
3.9 percent to 3.4 percent. As a result, the 2017 TCJA delivered its larg-
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Table 7.5 2019 Distributional Eﬀects of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
Income category
($ 000)
Less than 10
10–20
20–30
30–40
40–50
50–75
75–100
100–200
200–500
500–1,000
1,000 and over
Total

Tax reduction
($ billions)
0.4
1.8
3.0
5.4
6.7
23.0
22.4
70.4
65.5
23.9
36.9
259.5

Average tax rates (%)
2017
9.1
−0.7
3.9
7.9
10.9
14.8
17.0
20.9
26.4
30.9
32.5
20.7

2019
8.6
−1.2
3.4
7.0
9.9
13.5
15.6
19.4
23.9
27.8
30.2
19.0

Number of
taxpayers (in
millions)
19.3
20.6
21.5
16.0
12.8
27.4
17.8
30.7
9.2
1.1
0.6
177.0

NOTE: The table presents the aggregate tax reductions between 2017 and 2019, and the
average federal income tax rates in 2017 and 2019, for 11 income groups classiﬁed by
adjusted gross income as reported on tax forms.
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2019).

est tax reductions (as measured relative to pretax incomes) to the most
aﬄuent taxpayers.
Table 7.6 explores the sources of tax burden changes for aﬀected
taxpayer income groups. Entries in the table represent the aggregate
magnitudes of tax reductions between 2017 and 2019 for which the
listed tax bill provisions were responsible. Thus, for example, the tax
rate reductions in the 2017 bill lowered by $57.8 billion the aggregate
2019 tax liabilities of taxpayers in the $200,000–$500,000 income
group. The same taxpayer group also received $23.8 billion in aggregate tax savings from the 2017 bill’s signiﬁcant reduction in the alternative minimum tax but paid an additional $25.8 billion in aggregate taxes
because of the removal of personal exemptions.
Some patterns are evident from the information in Table 7.6. The
tax rate reductions in the 2017 bill reduced aggregate 2019 tax collections by $198.4 billion, with the beneﬁts concentrated among highincome taxpayers. The 2017 bill reduced aggregate tax collections
under the alternative minimum tax by $38.6 billion; almost all of this
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Table 7.6 2019 Distributional Eﬀects of Speciﬁc Provisions of the 2017
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
Income
category
($ 000)
Less than 10
10–20
20–30
30–40
40–50
50–75
75–100
100–200
200–500
500–1,000
1,000 and
over
Total

Alternative
Rate
minimum Personal Standard Itemized Child Tax
reduction tax (AMT) exemptions deduction deductions Credit
($ billions)
($)
($)
($)
($)
($)
0.0
0.0
0.3
1.3
2.7
12.3
14.7
61.1
57.8
18.6
29.5

1m
4m
0m
2m
6m
9m
9m
690 m
23.8 b
13.2 b
873 m

−1 m
−932 m
−2.8 b
−3.8 b
−4.9 b
−16.5 b
−17.7 b
−54.6 b
−25.8 b
−39 m
−1 m

182 m
3.3 b
5.9 b
7.0 b
7.7 b
20.4 b
16.8 b
37.2 b
9.6 b
1.1 b
425 m

0
−4 m
−60 m
−153 m
−231 m
−1.1 b
−1.7 b
−9.1 b
−21.5 b
−12.3 b
−30.0 b

82 m
1.0 b
2.4 b
3.5 b
4.3 b
9.8 b
7.7 b
23.9 b
13.5 b
93 m
0

198.4

38.6 b

−127.1 b

109.5 b

−$76.2 b

66.4 b

NOTE: The table presents the aggregate tax reductions between 2017 and 2019 due to
various provisions of the 2017 TCJA, distinguished by income groups as classiﬁed
by adjusted gross income reported on tax forms. The ﬁrst column reports tax reductions due to lower tax rates introduced by the TCJA. The second column reports tax
reductions due to changes in the alternative minimum tax. The third column reports
tax reductions (all of which are negative, so therefore correspond to tax increases)
that are due to the elimination of personal exemptions. The fourth column reports tax
reductions due to increases in the standard deduction. The ﬁfth column reports tax
reductions (all of which are negative, so therefore correspond to tax increases) that
are due to limitations on itemized deductions. The sixth column reports tax reductions
due to increases in the Child Tax Credit.
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2019).

tax reduction was enjoyed by taxpayers in the $200,000-to-$1-million
income range. The elimination of personal exemptions increased aggregate tax liabilities by $127.1 billion, most of it paid by taxpayers earning between $100,000 and $500,000, and virtually none of which paid
by taxpayers earning $500,000 or above (whose personal exemptions
had been already largely phased out under pre-2018 law). Increasing
the standard deduction reduced total tax collections by $109.5 billion,
and almost 70 percent of these beneﬁts were received by taxpayers
with incomes between $50,000 and $200,000. Increasing the Child Tax
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Credit reduced total tax collections by $66.4 billion, with the beneﬁts
concentrated among taxpayers with middle-to-high incomes; those with
incomes below $20,000 or above $500,000 received almost none of the
beneﬁts.
The 2017 legislation made several changes to itemized deductions, limiting the ability of taxpayers to claim deductions for state and
local tax payments, mortgage interest payments, casualty losses, moving expenses, alimony payments, and various miscellaneous itemized
deductions, including expenses incurred in income-earning activities.
In total, these restrictions reduced tax collections by $76.2 billion, with
the burden heavily concentrated among high-income taxpayers. For
example, these limits on itemized deductions increased by $30.0 billion the aggregate tax liabilities of taxpayers with incomes of $1 million or more, despite the relatively small number of such taxpayers; by
contrast, taxpayers with incomes below $100,000 (who itemize their
deductions at relatively low rates) were largely unaﬀected.
Those who have long advocated for broad-based, low-rate income
taxation got a version of what they asked for with the 2017 Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act. The 2017 TCJA reduced rates and removed deductions
and exemptions, moving federal income taxation in the direction of
a ﬂatter—and some would argue, simpler—tax system. The federal
income tax now collects less money than it would have absent the 2017
changes and does so in a manner that corresponds less to assigning
burdens according to ability to pay. While the individual income tax
features of the 2017 legislation move the federal revenue system in an
unfortunate direction according to these criteria, one way in which the
2017 TCJA is useful is that it illustrates what direction not to take in
crafting more wholesale reforms to the tax system.

PRINCIPLES OF INCOME TAXATION
Countries impose taxes in order to raise revenue to ﬁnance their
governments. The cost of raising revenue is that the accompanying
taxes impose burdens on individuals and businesses that pay the taxes,
and these taxes also impose costs on the economy as a whole by distorting economic incentives. Income taxation discourages income pro-
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duction, thereby reducing the eﬃciency of the economy and running
counter to most government objectives. The economic costs of the
distortions produced by income taxation almost always rise with the
amount of revenue collected,4 and with the extent of tax progressivity,
so a more distortionary tax system puts downward pressure on government spending and on the extent to which a government will be willing
to impose progressive taxes.
The cost of economic distortions is a function of the degree to
which price distortions discourage and alter economic activity. Properly designed income exclusions, tax deductions, and tax credits make
the tax system less distortionary by directing tax burdens at economic
activities that are less responsive to taxation. For example, while all
income taxes discourage labor supply, the eﬀects are more dramatic in
some instances, and for some groups of workers, than they are for others. Age is an obvious dimension along which the labor supply eﬀects
of taxation will usually diﬀer. For example, workers over 60 years old
are at far greater risk of retiring than are workers in their forties, so
high tax rates are much more likely to drive older workers out of the
labor force than they are to induce exit by middle-aged workers. Consequently, an eﬃcient tax system would oﬀer preferential treatment of
older workers, all other things being equal. And if a tax system does not
oﬀer special exemptions, deductions, or tax credits to elderly workers,
then the labor supply responsiveness of this group will put downward
pressure on income tax rates in general, since the government will know
that higher tax rates signiﬁcantly reduce the labor supply of a signiﬁcant
portion of the population.
Similar considerations apply to the tax treatment of working families with young children. Since children require care and supervision,
parents who work full time must incur out-of-pocket child-care costs,
many of which are avoidable if at least one of the parents were to stay
home with the children. High tax rates on working parents discourage labor force participation by reducing the net return from working—which has particularly strong eﬀects on income production by
parents of young children. The tax system can address this problem
most directly by providing tax deductions or tax credits for child-care
expenses incurred to accommodate the careers of working parents,
which has the eﬀect of more nearly taxing the net economic return to
working. While the U.S. tax system currently oﬀers modest versions of
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these deductions and credits, they are very much incomplete, which is
why high tax rates on labor income would strongly discourage parental
labor-force participation.
Certain forms of capital income are similarly sensitive to taxation.
Capital gains oﬀer an important example. Capital gains are taxed on
realization rather than accrual, so high rates of capital income taxation strongly discourage owners of appreciated assets from selling their
holdings, a phenomenon known as the “lock-in eﬀect.” Owners of
homes, shares of stock, small businesses, and other valuable properties
commonly retain their holdings far longer than they would otherwise
want to, in order to delay triggering capital gains taxes. By delaying
realizations, an owner implicitly earns returns on the taxes that are not
paid in the meantime. To the extent that capital income taxes apply to
capital gains, these taxes distort the economy by keeping homeowners
in homes they no longer want, investors in shares of companies they
no longer want to hold, and business owners in businesses they would
prefer to sell to others. Furthermore, anticipation of these taxes discourages investments in the ﬁrst place. The reality that capital-gains tax
realizations are highly sensitive to taxation accounts for the favorable
tax treatment that the federal income tax currently aﬀords to income
from long-term capital gains. In the absence of such favorable treatment, there would be very strong downward pressure on income tax
rates, as governments recognize that the lock-in eﬀect makes high rates
very costly.
The examples of the eﬀects of high tax rates on labor supply by
elderly workers, labor supply by working parents, and capital gains realizations, are just that: examples. In fact, there are scores of dimensions
along which economic activity is more and less responsive to taxation,
and which therefore from an eﬃciency standpoint justify favorable tax
treatment of certain taxpayers and activities, and less favorable treatment of others. In the absence of such tax diﬀerentiation, the system
becomes less eﬃcient and more costly, which makes governments less
willing to impose the high tax rates necessary to fund signiﬁcant government operations and to do so in a progressive manner.
The eﬃciency considerations that argue in favor of an extensive
system of tax preferences in the form of exclusions, deductions, and
credits simply add to traditional equity considerations. Taxpayers in
diﬀerent situations, and with diﬀerent forms of income, have diﬀering
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abilities to pay taxes, and therefore should be subject to taxation at different rates. Children again oﬀer an obvious example. A married couple
with labor income of $80,000 is clearly in a diﬀerent economic position
from a family consisting of a married couple and ﬁve children with a
family income of $80,000, and it is obvious that the childless couple has
in a very practical sense greater real income and therefore greater ability to pay taxes. The U.S. tax system oﬀers only very modest beneﬁts
to families with children and would need to do much more in order to
adjust properly for the eﬀect of family size on taxpaying ability. Failure
to adjust taxes properly for family size means not only that tax burdens are inequitably distributed between taxpaying families, but also
that there is downward pressure on tax rates in general, since high tax
rates without proper adjustments for family size would impose severe
burdens on families in certain circumstances.
Casualty losses oﬀer another example. A family whose home burns
down or whose car is stolen incurs signiﬁcant economic losses in addition to life disruption, insofar as any losses are uninsured. There is a
very real sense in which the family’s economic income in the year of
the incident is lower by the amount of the uninsured loss; and an uninsured loss certainly diminishes a family’s ability to pay federal income
taxes without incurring signiﬁcant economic hardship. Until 2018, it
was possible for U.S. taxpayers to claim deductions for casualty losses
to the extent that such losses exceeded 10 percent of adjusted gross
income, but provisions of the 2017 TCJA all but eliminated this deduction. The result is not only the serious inequity that follows from subjecting people to taxation based on inaccurate measures of their annual
incomes, but also downward pressure on tax rates, to prevent federal
income taxes from imposing signiﬁcant hardship on families incurring
casualty losses and other major economic disruptions.
There are many other dimensions along which the economic situations of taxpaying families diﬀer, and which bear on their ability to
pay federal taxes. Families incur medical and educational expenses, job
disruptions, investment reversals, loan demands from friends and relatives, and many other circumstances that could be reasonably accommodated by provisions in the tax system. It is a reality that tax breaks
given to one group of taxpayers must be made up by higher burdens on
other taxpayers, but fortunately there is a simple legislative method of
performing such an adjustment, which is to increase tax rates.
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INCOME TAXATION
A properly designed income tax oﬀers many exclusions, deductions,
and credits that accommodate individual situations and thereby adjust
tax burdens according to ability to pay. Such a system also imposes
relatively heavier burdens on income sources that are least responsive
to taxation. These features give the tax system a narrow base and relatively high rates. The high rates are indeed important attributes: a tax
system that imposes burdens in accordance with ability to pay has tax
rates that rise sharply with income, making the tax-rate schedule highly
progressive.
Under any circumstance, it is in the national interest to adopt an
income tax that imposes burdens according to ability to pay, but at a
time of heightened concern over the distribution of income there is even
greater need to adhere to sound principles in crafting income tax provisions. Sound tax design addresses income distribution concerns in several ways. The ﬁrst is by accommodating individual circumstances and
needs, implicitly adjusting tax burdens for diﬀerences in real incomes.
The second way in which sound tax design addresses income distribution concerns is by facilitating the imposition of a highly progressive
tax-rate schedule, one in which high-income taxpayers shoulder much
more of the tax burden than do low-income taxpayers. And the third
way is that sound tax design makes it feasible to ﬁnance signiﬁcant
government expenditures at a reasonable cost, which makes it possible
for the government to adopt spending measures that assist low-income
and otherwise vulnerable portions of the population.
The United States already has a progressive personal income tax,
and it already permits many exclusions, deductions, and tax credits that
narrow the base and, to a degree, adjust tax burdens to individual situations. These features of the income tax are widely criticized, notably
by advocates for greater tax progressivity, who feel that higher-income
taxpayers receive most of the beneﬁts of exclusions, deductions, and
tax credits. Evidence from tax ﬁlings conﬁrms that this observation
is largely correct: high-income taxpayers do indeed beneﬁt from tax
expenditures, with slightly more than half of the beneﬁts going to people in the top quintile of the income distribution, and just 8 percent of
the beneﬁts going to people in the bottom quintile.
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It is a mistake to conclude from this observation, as so many have,
that the answer to making the tax system more progressive lies in selective reductions in tax expenditures. On the contrary: in order to make
the tax system more progressive, it is necessary to expand signiﬁcantly
the number of tax expenditures, particularly those that beneﬁt highincome taxpayers. The tax-rate schedule can be made more progressive
only by adjusting the taxation of high-income earners for aspects of
their economic activities and personal situations that bear on their ability and willingness to pay taxes. Put simply, with diﬀerent design, it is
possible to impose higher tax rates on those with high incomes—but
this design will certainly entail signiﬁcant tax breaks for some with high
incomes. The tax system can thereby do much more to align tax burdens
with abilities to pay, and to relieve burdens on those who are struggling
economically—but such a system lies open to critique by well-meaning
critics who do not appreciate the connection between the breadth of the
tax base and the progressivity of tax rates.
Recent legislative developments are far from encouraging. The 2017
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act gave the tax system a narrower base and lower
rates, reducing its progressivity and also reducing total tax collections.
In eliminating or restricting tax deductions for casualty losses, alimony
payments, moving expenses, state and local income tax payments,
mortgage interest payments, and expenses incurred in income-earning
activities, the 2017 TCJA signiﬁcantly reduced the extent to which tax
burdens align with ability to pay. The tax-rate reductions enacted by the
TCJA simply add to the mismatch between tax burdens and taxpaying
ability, and the reduced tax collections make it ever more diﬃcult to
maintain government programs directed at those in challenging economic circumstances. The TCJA was the product of a political process
driven by many considerations, but underlying some of the changes that
it enacted was a mistaken sense that a broad-based, low-rate income tax
is better than the alternative. Certainly this is not the case if one desires
a tax that imposes burdens according to ability to pay and does so in
a progressive manner. But even if one’s goal is merely eﬃciency, not
equity or progressivity, a good tax system is highly diﬀerentiated, oﬀering multiple exclusions, deductions, and credits.
It is important not to overlook eﬃciency in designing a tax system, whether or not analysts and advocates are motivated by a desire
to distribute tax burdens equitably. A more eﬃcient tax system oﬀers
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greater opportunity to pursue all objectives, including those related to
equity; and in particular, a more eﬃcient tax system can support a more
progressive tax rate structure at lower cost than does a less eﬃcient
tax system. In addition, a more eﬃcient tax system makes it feasible
for the government to ﬁnance worthwhile expenditures, including those
that may have redistributive eﬀects. Properly crafted tax expenditures
enhance the eﬃciency of the tax system by directing tax burdens to
where they have the least eﬀect of discouraging income production,
thereby making the economy more productive.
Postwar U.S. history includes long stretches of time over which tax
rates were high and the tax system oﬀered extensive exclusions, deductions, and tax credits. The recent movement has been in the opposite
direction, and to little good eﬀect from the standpoints of aligning tax
burdens with ability to pay and ﬁnancing the U.S. government. Those
inclined to criticize tax breaks as giveaways to the rich might do well
to reﬂect on the alternative, which is a stripped-down tax system with
relatively ﬂat rates and little if any accommodation for the needs of
individual taxpayers. In fact, the tax system needs more of what it once
had, with high tax rates but also extensive tax preferences for certain
types of income and taxpayers in speciﬁed circumstances. Only then
will it be possible to address the income distribution concerns, and the
government ﬁnancing concerns, that properly motivate those interested
in contemporary U.S. economic policy.

Notes
1. See, for example, Pechman (1977), Century Foundation Working Group (2002),
Reid (2017), and Sarin and Summers (2019).
2. In tax year 2015, 44.6 million U.S. tax returns itemized deductions out of
150.5 million returns ﬁled, representing 29.6 percent of the total. These and
other tax-return data are available at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats
-individual-income-tax-return-form-1040-statistics.
3. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO 2019) reports that, in 2018, total U.S.
federal government revenues were $3,329 billion, of which $1,684 billion (50.6
percent) represented individual income taxes, and $1,171 billion (35.2 percent)
were payroll taxes.
4. Atkinson and Stern (1974) identify exceptional cases in which higher tax revenues
can be associated with reduced economic distortions; see Dahlby (2008) for a
review of this literature.
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